Illusion of independence: why the MP abbreviation disappeared, but the connection remained

Can we say that there is a Russian church in Ukraine?

Both yes and no. Legally, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) is registered without the "Moscow Patriarchate" (MP) suffix. There is no registered Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) either. But the church exists in two planes: in the legal field of the state and in Universal Orthodoxy. And from the point of view of the latter, for which nothing has changed, the structure we know as the UOC remains part of the Moscow Patriarchate.

But in 2022, at the synod, didn't they remove the mention of the Russian Orthodox Church?

In the statute - yes. But they kept the mention that they are guided by the charter of Patriarch Alexy II on independence in administration. In reality, this is window dressing: the charter left them within the framework of the Moscow Patriarchate and gave no full independence. The very mention of this document emphasizes their status precisely within the MP, not outside it.

So, if a person says: "I am going to the UOC, it has nothing to do with the RF," is there actually a direct connection?

Yes. Most parishioners go there out of habit because it's the closest church. They are used to a certain religious subculture: the Russian pronunciation of the Church Slavonic language, headscarves, and other secondary things. The church says "UOC," and people sincerely believe they have no connection to the Russian church.

Therefore, sociology, which gives the MP only 3-4% in Ukraine, is misleading. There are significantly more parishioners. It's just that now most Ukrainians shy away from the "Moscow Patriarchate" suffix because it has become toxic. But on Sundays, they go exactly there, not always realizing it. Another part consciously believes that only in the MP is there the true church and grace - this is a "magic word" for them. However, few people advertise this openly.

Before the full-scale invasion, they were at 13%, and it also seems to me that the figure is underestimated.

The main reason: when asked directly about the MP, people deny it. Either they don't realize it, or they simply want to look better during sociological surveys.

In 2018, there was a proposal to force the church to add the word "Russian" to its name. Why didn't this happen, and would it have affected the number of believers?

It certainly would have. If the MP suffix appeared on their churches tomorrow, most would stop going there. Therefore, there was fierce resistance to this renaming among conscious priests and the faithful.

Until 2017-2018, the UOC never denied belonging to the MP; on the contrary, they emphasized it as a sign of "canonicity." But due to the RF's hybrid aggression, this abbreviation became increasingly toxic. The situation escalated when Constantinople revoked the subordination of the Kyiv Metropolis to Moscow and later granted the Tomos to the OCU. Another church appeared in Ukraine that is legitimate in the eyes of Universal Orthodoxy. The UOC understood perfectly well: if they indicated their affiliation with the ROC in their name, it would threaten the loss of most of the faithful.

Court battles and the problem of transitions: why believers cling to habit

I found information that about a dozen monasteries in Ukraine, such as Koretsky in the Rivne region, are still directly subordinated to Kirill. Why is the state unable to deal with this at this stage of the war?

Direct subordination of important monasteries to the patriarch is a common practice in world Orthodoxy. Since the UOC is part of the MP, the Moscow patriarch has jurisdiction over this entire church, even if he cannot fully exercise it now. We don't have many such monasteries, but they exist.

The state cannot deal with this because the cases are stuck in courts. This was not difficult to predict: church representatives refuse to comply with orders, file appeals and counter-lawsuits to drag out time as much as possible. Their leadership hopes that the war will end with a compromise that takes their interests into account. Therefore, they are now trying to keep their structure as integral as possible so that during a real peace process, this "card" is on the table and they become part of the agreement.

If you look at the statistics of transitions to the OCU: in 2023, the process was active; in 2025 - only about a hundred. Out of over 8,000 communities, over 7,000 remain in the UOC. Can the state work with this somehow? After all, force doesn't work.

The state only asked the UOC to clearly declare a break with the Russian church and withdraw from the governing bodies of the MP. In words, they did this, but on paper - they refused. The state cannot dictate where to transition: religious communities are legal entities, and decisions are made exclusively from below, by the people themselves.

At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the transition process was emotional. Where parishioners realized that the head of their church was blessing rockets flying at their heads, activists quickly initiated transitions. Seeing this, in May 2022, the UOC convened a council and did a "cosmetic repair" of the statute, allowing them not to commemorate Kirill. No canonical decisions for Universal Orthodoxy were made, but this somewhat eased the conscience of the pro-Ukrainian wing. At the same time, it also satisfied the pro-Russian wing, which continues to commemorate the patriarch and sing about "Holy Rus." Everyone got what they wanted, and the pace of transitions dropped significantly.

But the problem is not only with the MP. The OCU has also not yet become attractive enough for UOC believers. For many, church is not about high theological matters, but a clear tradition. The familiar Russian pronunciation, familiar chants, and their own priest keep people through inertia, and the OCU seems "lacking grace" to them. In addition, the OCU has been unable to offer a more intellectual, progressive face for that part of the thinking intelligentsia that is looking for an alternative but remains in the UOC. Therefore, this is a very complex problem.

But it's faith!

That is only its outer shell. The faith itself in the OCU and UOC is absolutely identical; there is no difference. But for people, this shell and familiar rituals are usually more important than truly significant issues. Most do not delve into canonical nuances and the real connections of their church with Moscow.

Russian spirit in seminaries: where and how priests were formed

Where did MP and OCU priests study? What was considered a prestigious education for them?

An interesting question. Most UOC MP priests received their education in Ukrainian seminaries, some of which are very saturated with the Russian spirit - such as Pochaiv or Odesa. Of course, this is now hidden behind a screen, but the ideas of "Holy Rus," a single Orthodox Slavic civilization, and books about Tsar Nicholas II have not disappeared. It was a bit freer in the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, but in general, all schools took Russian Orthodoxy as a model. Many priests received academic degrees or basic theological education directly in Russian academies and seminaries.

Only a very small portion of UOC MP representatives studied abroad. Some, under Moscow's control, were directed to the Russian Orthodox seminary in Paris. A few studied in Catholic institutions in Rome, Fribourg, or Leuven. But overall, only a few received a European education, while the bulk are graduates of MP seminaries in Ukraine and Russia.

In the OCU, the situation is different: most of the modern young clergy graduated from their own educational institutions in Volyn, Lviv, and Kyiv. But the older generation studied back in Soviet times in Russian schools - Kaliningrad, Leningrad, or Moscow seminaries, so their formation was also oriented toward Russia to some extent. Now the OCU has started sending students to study in Greece, and this could help them raise their own intellectual theological level.

Previously, the problem with OCU seminaries was the low level of foreign language study, which made them dependent on Russian. Russia printed literature en masse, and seminarians—even from the Kyiv Patriarchate or the UAOC—read precisely that. There is a lot of English-language Orthodox literature in the world, particularly thanks to the intellectually strong Orthodox Church in America. But to read it, one needs to know languages. We hope the situation in the OCU will change and the graduate profile will improve. As for the UOC-MP, it is hard to say that any changes are taking place there.

Trap for refugees: how the church splits the Ukrainian diaspora abroad

An interesting situation with our diaspora abroad. In a recent investigation, journalists claim that the Russian church is opening parishes there, masquerading as the Ukrainian Orthodox one.

This is not a new tactic. Recall how the name Ukrainian Orthodox Church appeared in the first place. In the late 1980s, the ROC saw that the Soviet Union was collapsing, the UGCC was emerging from the underground in Ukraine, national sentiments were growing, and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was forming. Realizing these threats, Moscow decided to give its structure a more "Ukrainian facade." In 1990, the Russian Synod decided to rename the Ukrainian Exarchate of the ROC to the UOC. Of course, only the sign changed, while the structure remained the same.

It is clear that this was obvious to researchers and those in the know. But is it obvious to people who fled the war abroad?

They are playing out the same scenario. For most Ukrainian refugees, even Russian-speaking ones from the east who attended the Moscow Patriarchate all their lives, the name ROC is currently absolutely toxic—they will not go there. Of course, there are exceptions. Not all refugees are rooting for Ukraine; some welcomed the aggression but simply fled the hostilities—such people don't care, they will go to the ROC even abroad. But for the bulk of believers, this is unacceptable.

And in order not to scare these people away but to keep them, they founded the Western European Vicariate of the UOC as a subdivision of the Kyiv Metropolis. This was also a tactical move. The most developed structure in our diaspora is the UGCC; there are also Ukrainian Orthodox communities in the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. So that refugees wouldn't happen to go there, Moscow created an "alternative" for them.

So this network in Western Europe began to be actively created precisely to avoid letting people go. True, even during the hybrid phase of the war, in one of the districts of Toronto where the post-Soviet diaspora lives, they founded such a Ukrainian MP community. But the sign, of course, read: Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

Here we also need to mention the OCU. 

According to the Tomos, they cannot create communities outside of Ukraine—this is handled by the Ecumenical Patriarchate. But the canonical side of the Tomos is for peacetime, and today we are at war, so sometimes one has to deviate from the rules. There were agreements that the Ecumenical Patriarchate was ready to accept OCU priests to serve Ukrainians abroad. But I don't know to what extent the OCU has taken advantage of this. It is difficult: you cannot simply send a person to where they do not know the language and the legal framework, how to establish a community, and so on. Moreover, the OCU lacks priests in Ukraine too, so who can they send abroad?

But the UOC-MP has finances and good consultants (coordinating with the ROC) who help organize daily life and establish contacts with local Catholics to rent a church. The internet is full of photos where UOC-MP priests serve together with ROC representatives.

How can a citizen abroad understand that the church they have come to is related to Russia? They don't write it on the walls.

If it is a parish of the Western European Vicariate of the UOC, they most likely commemorate Metropolitan Onufriy of Kyiv but do not mention Patriarch Kirill. However, Onufriy himself remains a member of the Holy Synod of the ROC. He has not provided any documents to the State Service for Ethnopolitics that would confirm his exit from this structure; there are only oral statements. In Russia, he is still considered a Metropolitan of the ROC. If this church wanted to prove its independence from Moscow, it would simply fulfill the official requirements—there is nothing extraordinary there.

And who recognized the UOC at all? To whom are they subordinate, if supposedly not the ROC?

They don't need to call Moscow every time to open a parish or resolve current issues. They are independent in internal affairs, even electing bishops themselves. But in Ecumenical Orthodoxy, the UOC is recognized exclusively as a metropolia of the ROC.

So their tactic is to hide information, wait it out, keep the people, and then take off the mask?

Currently, their goal is to preserve the structure as much as possible in these difficult conditions and drag out time. We do not know what will happen after the war and how they will explain it. Much will depend on the terms of the war's end. It will be interesting to see if they restore this currently hidden connection with Russia openly.

From KGB to soft power: historical roots of church agency

What is the main threat of such a church to Ukraine? After all, allegations of religious freedom violations are often heard.

The RF has always used the church as an ideology. This is rooted back in the 19th century in the triad "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality." In the Soviet Union, the Bolsheviks initially persecuted the church, but Stalin realized it was a convenient tool for Russification and began using the ROC in the annexed western territories. And in the late 1950s, the ROC became a tool of international "soft power" to show the "civilized face" of the USSR and the existence of "religious freedom."

Research into declassified KGB archives (which we have the largest of among post-Soviet republics) clearly shows: in the 1960s, 100% of the ROC episcopate in Ukraine were KGB agents. They acted consciously, with initiative, and built the agent network themselves. The ROC has never re-evaluated this experience or condemned cooperation with the special services. Therefore, this tradition obviously persists to this day.

During the period of Ukrainian independence, Russia continued to use the church as soft power. All the literature about tsars, the "valiant Russian army," the concept of a "triune people" and a "great Orthodox civilization" formed a common cultural space. One didn't even need to recruit a priest to collect intelligence—he simply broadcasted Russian narratives. Some listened to Russian rap, and others went to the MP—it made no difference to the imperial machine.

This cannot be gotten rid of in one generation. Enlightenment and a real alternative, which the OCU must offer, are needed. At the same time, many MP believers, shocked by Patriarch Kirill's aggressive position, simply turned around and went to Greek or Roman Catholics, Baptists, or Pentecostals. The UOC has indeed become much smaller.

Why the ban is stalled and what awaits the Moscow church after the war

Patriots are calling for the UOC-MP to be banned; there is indignation over the Rada's delay. But in the West, particularly in the USA, they say this cannot be done. How would you comment on this?

The law has been passed, but I was skeptical of it from the start. It is very difficult to execute: it bans the activities of the ROC, but legally it does not exist in Ukraine; there is the UOC. They removed mentions of the MP from the charter; if necessary, they will hang blue-and-yellow flags but will do everything to preserve the structure. It was obvious that cases would get stuck in the courts for years.

The international image has worsened not so much because of the law, but because of our state's weak communication. We have shown too few criminal cases: for about 10,000 priests, there are perhaps just over a hundred of them. How to prove to the international community that an entire church should be banned because of the crimes of a hundred people? Western partners emphasize individual responsibility for a crime, not collective.

But research into KGB archives regarding their cooperation is telling.

Yes, but these documents cut off in the 1960s. The Russian special services will never give us modern evidence. We understand everything, but proving this influence legally is extremely difficult. Moreover, the MP's lobbying campaign in the West is very powerful. The Russian Church and the UOC involve Western lawyers, such as Robert Amsterdam, who gave an interview to Tucker Carlson and acted in the interests of MP subdeacon Vadym Novynskyi. This hit our positions hard.

However, understanding of the problem is gradually growing in the West. For example, Belgium's intelligence services did not allow the registration of an ROC parish because it could not prove the absence of influence from the Russian state. Estonia is also trying to separate this structure from Moscow by deporting suspicious priests. Ukraine should have acted systematically, looking for partners at a global level instead of solving the problem alone – that is exactly why we were losing.

Shouldn't European countries reflect on the danger? After all, by registering the Russian church through our diaspora, a whole network is being formed there. What could its influence be?

Percentage-wise, these communities are small, so they do not have a decisive influence on the policy of European states, and no direct threat is seen there. The main danger lies elsewhere: the ROC is trying to split the Ukrainian diaspora. In America, Ukrainian Orthodox and Greek Catholics work closely together, lobbying for our state's interests. Instead, Ukrainians who end up in ROC parishes or the Western European Vicariate of the UOC are separated from the Ukrainian core. They find themselves in their own bubble, become part of the Russian or post-Soviet diaspora, and culturally no longer identify with Ukraine. This is a deliberate scenario that is being implemented now.

His Beatitude Lubomyr Huzar said that there are no Ukrainians from the west or the east – there are those who love or do not love Ukraine. What could be our successful development scenario in the context of this church?

The end of the war will be a moment of truth for the UOC, where they will be forced to take a stand. It is interesting whether they will continue to deny their connection with the MP, as they do now, or openly return to subordination to Moscow and once again become Russia's 'soft power.' We remember how their hierarchs did not stand up in the Verkhovna Rada to honor fallen soldiers, and did not even apologize. This was a spit in the face of society.

Right now, their leadership hopes that the war will end in Russia's favor and that they will be guaranteed immunity. Perhaps a split will occur in this church: some priests understand that Russian Orthodoxy no longer has a place in Ukraine. But there are still those who firmly believe in their survival under any conditions. For now, this is reading tea leaves.

So, the ideal scenario is our victory and that this church moves to the margins?

I have no doubt that this church will be marginalized. It is enough to look at the Ukrainian youth, who have faced incredible trials. They know perfectly well who is to blame for this and will not tolerate such a church. No one will persecute them, but the youth will not go to these churches, perhaps only marginals.

Interviewed by Svitlana Zhabyuk

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