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The legitimacy of the Russian state rests only on stability, which includes order and wellfare, and coercion. All this works when there is stability. When it’s gone, only the security forces remain. Valerii Pekar, publicist and teacher of Kyiv-Mohyla Business School, analyzes the factors of the inevitable dismantling of the Russian Federation.
Historical parallels
Today, many people who want to predict the nature of future events keep the book «The Last Empire« by the outstanding historian Serhii Plokhy on their desk. This is the story of the collapse of the Soviet Union – from the beginning of the year, when it was a powerful state, whose citizens voted in a referendum for its preservation, to the end of the same year, when the Soviet Union ceased to exist as a political entity, and the citizens of Ukraine almost unanimously voted for independence.
In 1991, the first phase of the empire’s collapse occurred, but it wasn’t the last one. The next phase will be happening soon, so the lessons from the previous phase will be useful. From the above-mentioned book (and from people’s own observations of that era -who actually have it), we will need several key points.
First, the empire crumbles extremely slowly, and then it makes it suddenly. All the «links» (sources of legitimacy) gradually weaken, but the system holds together until a strong push – because it belongs to the «collective imagined» entity, which is anchored in thinking, but also inertial. The Russian Federation had a lot of such «links», but all of them have now weakened tremendously. Thus, apart from their remnants, everything is held together only by habit. This does not mean that the empire will simply fall tomorrow morning – it can hold out for a relatively long time. But its disintegration will be rapid, almost instantaneous by historical standards, as it happened in 1991.
Secondly, the key role in the formation of new states is played by the old management elites, and not at all by nationalist dissidents. Let me remind you that Ukraine’s independence was proclaimed by the Verkhovna Rada, where communists were in the majority. They played a key role in all other processes of dismantling the USSR. Charismatic dissidents show the direction of the movement and empower their followers, but in fact, the key role does not belong to them, but to the old elites.
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Thirdly, the basis of the empire’s collapse is, surprisingly, the desire to preserve the old, and not the desire to create a new one. Both the masses and the elites are trying to maintain security and stability. But if earlier, the center held on to the fact that it was the provider of this security, then after the tipping point, it’s already a source of danger and instability, so everyone starts looking for a new provider. Let’s be honest, for the majority of the masses and elites at that time, the declaration of Ukraine’s independence was an attempt to preserve the «Soviet Union» within smaller borders – in conditions where only trouble was expected from Moscow.
Finally, the fourth point. The processes of disintegration are fueled primarily by economic factors, identity here rather gives the process a certain form than is its engine. National movements in most of the Soviet republics were quite weak compared to economic aspirations (in the Ukrainian case – also ecological aspirations, let’s remember Chornobyl). Powerful national movements existed only in the Baltic republics, but they, with all due respect, did not play a key role in dismantling the USSR.
It is 2022 now. And we will see that history repeat itself now, with corrections for the difference between then and now.
What is different now compared to 1991:
- The degree of readiness and maturity of local management elites in Russian regions is significantly lower than in the leading Soviet republics of the 1991 model.
- The number of potential fragments of the empire is much higher (somewhere under 30, not 15).
- The probability of inter-regional and inter-national conflicts is significantly higher (intentional divergence between ethnic and administrative boundaries).
- Everything happens against the background of war and actual military defeat, in the conditions of the availability of weapons and the devaluation of life.
What is the same now, as it was in 1991:
1. The above four factors:
- nonlinearity of the decay process,
- the key role of the old management elites,
- the desire for stability and security,
- economic factors.
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2. The degree of readiness of the West (America, Europe) for the collapse of the empire is extremely low. We need to talk about this in more detail.
In 1991, the West was not prepared for the collapse of the Soviet Union (remember the «Chicken Kiev Speech«, the failed speech of the American president in Kyiv just weeks before the declaration of independence). Similarly, the West is not even ready to hear about the collapse of the Russian Federation.
The position of the great powers is an important factor. They sought to preserve an integral empire in 1917-1922 – in fact, all the peoples of Europe, except the Ukrainians, gained independence, but the Ukrainians were denied it in order to preserve an integral Russia (this is discussed in detail by Yaroslav Hrytsak in «Essay on the History of Ukraine«). They tried in vain to preserve an intact empire in 1991, but quickly recovered and accepted the new geopolitical realities. Now, they strive to preserve a whole empire.
There are objective reasons for this: the collapse of the Russian Federation carries unacceptable risks.
The risk of uncontrolled nuclear weapons spread. Instead of the hands of one Moscow authoritarian ruler, weapons may end up in the hands of dozens of unknown and little-understood new leaders who will compete for statuses and territories. Also, it’s possible, that they will be ready to exchange these weapons for the support of larger states.
The risk of excessive strengthening of China at the expense of Siberia. Exclusive conditions of access to the resources of the richest Russian regions will make China not only stronger, but also more insolent in international affairs.
The risk of radical Islamism. The collapse of the Russian Federation will be used not only by China, but also by some competing leaders of the Islamic world in order to gain greater significance and influence. This process can have both positive consequences for international peace and cooperation, and negative consequences – in the event that radical Islamism turns out to be the winner in the struggle for influence.
The risk of internal conflicts, ethnic cleansing and local wars, which will lead to the largest refugee crisis in recent human history – we are talking about tens of millions of people. (Let’s not forget about the artificially distorted borders of the national republics in order to move part of the representatives of the nationality outside the borders of the republic, and more ethnic Russians inside.)
In order to avoid such risks, the West will be ready to do anything to preserve the integrity of the Russian Federation, the legitimacy and capacity of the Moscow authorities.
But the fact is that it’s impossible to preserve the integrity of this system.
The fragility of the empire
The word «collapse» is cognate with the word «fragility». In order to understand how likely Russia’s collapse is and what it will look like, it’s necessary to examine the system from the point of view of fragility.
Many people believe that the collapse of Russia will come as a result of economic problems. But economic problems themselves cannot destroy the country, it’s important to consider them in the context of the existing management system.
1. Fragile management system
Today’s Russia is an extremely centralized management system: in fact, everything depends on one person. Such a system is very fragile for a number of reasons.
First, the centralized management system («red» in terms of integral dynamics) does not outlive its leader. In such a system, there are no mechanisms for legal succession or conflict resolution – the leader does this alone, on the basis of personal relationships with people from his environment. For the system to fall apart, the leader does not have to die at all (although he is often helped), it’s enough to show weakness («Akela missed») – that’s why in the ancient «red» management systems, the killer of the king becomes the king instead: because if the king became so weak, that he allowed himself to be killed – it must end up like this, because weakness is incompatible with sacredness. Instead, the challenger apparently has the «mark of the gods» (charisma in ancient Greek).
Even in the conditions of a hierarchical management system («blue» in terms of integral dynamics), such as the communist Soviet Union, new leaders (Stalin after Lenin, Khrushchev after Stalin, Brezhnev after Khrushchev, Gorbachev after Brezhnev) needed a long time to consolidate power. And this in the presence of a collegial body that could ensure legal succession (Politburo). In the conditions of the «red» system, a clan war is inevitable, which sends a clear signal to all elites that the centre is no longer the guarantor of security, stability, order, and monetary income.
Secondly, the centralized «red» management system produces management decisions of very low quality. In the hierarchical «blue» system there is a common ideology and at least some social elevators: in the Soviet Union, there was a communist ideology, which was laughed at in the late USSR, but it gave at least a common worldview of the elites, and the elevators were provided by the apparatus of the Communist Party and the Komsomol [the youth department of the party]. In contrast, the «red» management system has neither ideology nor elevators, so the only way to approach the center is through personal loyalty. This creates an atmosphere of lies, sycophancy and mutual subterfuge. True information is not able to make its way to the decision-making center, because the leader rewards for pleasant information and punishes for unpleasant. This increases the number and weight of errors.
A fragile management system can exist for quite a long time in stable conditions, but falls apart in a crisis.
2. Economic problems
First of all, the majority of the population has always lived in poverty, so for them, the current economic problems of Russia are almost imperceptible («if we never lived well, then it’s not worth starting»). In addition to this, a significant proportion of Russians is ready to almost starve for the sake of the greatness of their country (as they understand it). Instead, economic problems hit a social stratum that can be broadly called «hedonists» (because the term «middle class» sounds too narrow in this context), which includes skilled workers, the creative class, small and medium-sized entrepreneurs, the lower level of government officials and security forces, etc. For many years, the regime nurtured their political passivity and loyalty – in exchange for modest or not so modest welfare. Nowadays, this prosperity is rapidly disappearing.
Secondly, there is a huge gap between the center and the regions. We in Ukraine (almost homogenous in terms of economic development) find it quite difficult to imagine such a level of disparity. A reduction in available resources means that the subsidized regions will get even less, and the donor regions will think about the feasibility of feeding others (primarily the center that lives best). Resource depletion is not a significant problem under conditions of homogeneity, but becomes devastating under conditions of significant disparity.
3. Destruction of «scraps»
Even in crisis conditions, fragile systems can survive if they are capable of ideological or forceful mobilization of their members.
State formations in the modern world are based either on national identity (like most mononational countries, an extreme example is Japan), or on civic identity (like the USA). States with very diverse populations base their legitimacy either on maximum decentralization (for example, India) or on a rigid ideology and repressive apparatus (China or the USSR). A country that has a strong national identity, a rigid ideology, and a repressive apparatus can hold on very firmly (Iran). Finally, there are many countries that have none of the above and hold together only until the first major crisis (look at Iraq or Syria). Of course, this model is very simplified, but it allows you to understand what Russia is standing on.
Unlike the USSR, Russia does not have «links» in the form of ideology. «Russian world» proved to be unattractive outside of Russia and for national republics, religions are diverse, and «Pobedobesie» [refering to the obsessity with the victory in WWII] offers only a picture of the past, while only a picture of the future is capable of uniting (communism, which everyone had expected in the USSR, is a striking example). Today’s Russia has no picture of the future.
Therefore, the legitimacy of the Russian state rests only on stability (which includes order and wellfare), as well as coercion. All this works when there is stability. When it’s not there, the security forces remain.
But the security forces belong to the middle stratum affected by the economic crisis (except for their top officials), and are now to some extent destroyed or disabled. The Russian invasion involved the active participation of the Russian Guard and police special forces in the second echelon of the offensive (clearing the rear, that’s what the lists, plastic bags and mobile crematoria were for), but in the general chaos, they often found themselves on the front lines. Nowadays, the power resource is no longer unlimited.
In other words, today Russia is holding on to almost nothing. This does not mean that it will disintegrate immediately: even in this state it can exist for a relatively long time. Until the moment when the shock will throw it out of balance and reveal the lack of mechanisms for binding the system.
And here, the lack of a common ideology, religious and national diversity, the gap in levels of economic development will play their destructive role.
And the basis of all this is the imperial character of the Russian «federation», a federation only in words.
4. Mosaic identities
The main feature of empire is the difference in status and rights between representatives of the dominant identity and representatives of secondary autochthonous (non-immigrant) identities.
The Soviet Union actively planted a common identity («Soviet people»), while today’s Russia cannot offer such a model. The attempt to introduce different concepts for ethnicity and citizenship («russkiy» and «rossiyanin») only emphasizes the inferiority of other peoples and the artificiality of such constructions. The Soviet identity was shared (a kind of «second floor» pretending to be the main one), but the «Russian» identity means nothing.
Identity, as Francis Fukuyama emphasizes in the book of the same name, is a powerful force in the civil movement. It is based on a sense of collective dignity, resistance to collective humiliation. This force can be more powerful than economic factors. And although today, at first glance, national movements are passive, this passivity is deceptive (especially in the absence of reliable sociological data).
On the one hand, the visible national movements are too weak, the political and informational field is actively «cleansed», the national republics are largely Russified.
On the other hand, new charismatic leaders have already emerged, economic problems and easing of imperial pressure are fueling local identities; constant linguistic, cultural oppression and, ultimately, heavy losses of Russia’s «non-Russian» peoples in the war with Ukraine keep colonial humiliation in constant focus.
Only according to official data, 22% of the population are not Russian. In fact, this number is higher (perhaps even twice): people are actively registering as «Russian», we are familiar with this. The dynamics of changes in the national composition between censuses confirms this hypothesis.
Simultaneously with the old national identities, new ones can be formed quite quickly («Siberians» will strongly resemble the Americans who separated from the British) and the old ones thoroughly destroyed during the Soviet period («Cossacks») can be reconstructed. Regional identities can appear literally out of thin air, but in fact, they have a certain basis (Ural Republic, Far Eastern Republic, etc.). Economic self-sufficiency of the regions will fuel this process.
Ethnic conflicts will intensify: everyone will blame everyone else for their own problems, and the growth of Russian nationalism will fuel national movements in the republics and vice versa. If (when) it breaks out in several places at the same time, there will not be enough power or money to put it out. And then, we will have a «domino effect».
So, we considered the four components of the empire’s fragility: management system, economic problems, lack of ideological and weakening unifying forces, diversity of identities.
In other words, there are more and more centrifugal forces and less and less cohesive forces. The main factors of unification continue to be monetary subsidies and force pressure. Both of these factors are now significantly weakening.
Conclusions
Therefore, we have the weakening of the leader in an overly centralized management system, the lack of consolidation and friction in the upper layer of the elites (although Putin remains the only subject of decision-making), economic decline, the weakening of ideological and power factors of unity, as well as the growth of national and regional identities.
The weakening of the factors holding the empire together is not an exceptional situation: from time to time, similar challenges arise. Basically, there are two possible reactions from the imperial center: screwing the nuts and unscrewing the nuts. The third option – stability – can exist only in conditions of long-term peace and persistently high oil prices.
Screwing the nuts can be based either on money (we exchange freedom for welfare, as it was in the first years of Putin), or on the power apparatus (as in Stalin’s). If there is no money, and the power apparatus is incompetent, it can end in an explosion (coup d’état attempt by the State Committe on the State of Emergency (GKChP) and subsequent events).
Unscrewing the nuts is used to consolidate power in the center. This was done by Lenin to marginalize independence movements during the creation of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev did this in order to overcome the hard communists of the old variety. Yeltsin did this by offering the regions «as much sovereignty as you can swallow», and if oil prices had not gone up, the declarations of sovereignty adopted by the national republics would eventually have been implemented.
Putin can resort to screwing the nuts, and this will lead to an explosion. Putin’s successors will unscrew the nuts to consolidate power in the center, and this will lead to a flight in different directions.
Since the collapse of the empire is inevitable, but carries unacceptable risks, this process must be controlled to minimize the risks and mitigate the consequences.
To those who believe that the collapse of the empire is not inevitable, I note: the risks are so great that even if this scenario is not the main one, it still requires serious consideration and preparation.
An uncontrolled collapse threatens all of the above risks at the same time. These risks are too great to be ignored.
Controlled reconstruction will make it possible to get out of the crisis with minimal losses: establish contacts with future leaders in advance, agree on the future status, prevent conflicts in advance, etc.
Ukraine is more than anyone interested in the controllability of the process of reconstruction of the Russian Federation. On the one hand, political changes in Russia are the only way to obtain the final victory of Ukraine, on the other hand, all the troubles of an uncontrolled collapse will hit our country first of all.
How the process will develop is well described in the text by Janusz Bugajski. All this will partly resemble 1991, but at the same time it will give rise to an unprecedented mixture of old local bureaucrats, charismatic national dissidents, regional industrialists and local security forces.
The positive features of the controlled process are:
- The possibility of achieving denuclearization of newly independent states.
- Minimization of migration crises and terrorist threats.
- A higher probability of finding an understanding with the new leaders compared to Putin or his successors.
The possibility of reducing the threat from China, because an uncontrolled collapse leads to the transformation of the whole Russia into a Chinese satellite, and controlled reconstruction allows to bring part of the regions into the orbit of the democratic world, including by using the anti-Chinese sentiments of the Turkic peoples.
Despite the apparent weakness of the national movements, the contradiction between them and the Russian opposition «liberals» (who want to preserve the «one and indivisible»), as well as the imposed fear of independence and learned helplessness, the deconstruction of the empire will be quick and inevitable.
By Valerii Pekar, translated by Vitalii Holich
The author’s column is a reflection of the author’s subjective position. The editors of «Tvoe Misto» do not always share the opinions expressed in the columns, and are ready to give those who disagree the opportunity for a reasoned answer.
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